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THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
A STUDY IN OVERESTIMATION
REGINALD PARKERt
THE Administrative Procedure Act,1 whose full title is "An Act to improve
the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure,"
has been presented to the public as "a strongly marked, long sought, and widely
heralded advance in democratic government" that despite its brevity "is a
comprehensive charter of private liberty and a solemn undertaking of official
fairness . . . intended as a guide to him who seeks fair play and equal rights
under law. . . . It upholds law and yet lightens the burden of those on whom
the law may impinge. It enunciates and emphasizes the tripartite form of our
government and brings into relief the ever essential declaration that this is
government of law rather than of men." These are the words of Senator
McCarran in his foreword to his edition of the legislative history of the Act.
2
Combining the role of author with that of principal panegyrist of the APA,
the Senator four years later hailed his law as "the most important statute
affecting the administration of justice in the federal field since the passage
of the Judiciary Act of 1789."3 Words like these are so obviously exaggerated
that no refutation is necessary. Even the comparatively moderate reference
to the Judiciary Act is clearly out of place in view of the fact that the Judiciary
Act created the federal judiciary out of a vacuum, whereas the APA neither
created nor substantially altered a single government agency.4 A more tem-
perate investigation reveals that the Act's chief merit lies in the fact that it
has refrained from any telling innovation.
The history of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 goes back to the year
1936, when the President's Committee on Administrative Management was
tVisiting Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. This article is the substance
of a chapter of the author's forthcoming book, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A TEFT, scheduled
by The Bobbs-Merrill Co. for the fall of 1951.
1. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011 (Supp. 1950).
2. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. iii(1946) (hereinafter cited as SEN. Doc.
No. 248).
3. McCarran, Three Years of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 38 GEO.
L. J. 574 (1950) ; Vanderbilt, FOREWORD; THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES iv (Warren ed. 1947); SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 298,
327; Note 32, A. B. A. J. 377 (1946).
4. See the balanced account in HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
624-36 (1950); Note, 56 YAI.E L. J. 670 (1947). And see also Nathanson, Some Com-
ments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. REV. 368 (1946).
5. See SEN. Doc. No. 248; ATTY. GEN. MAN. AD. PROc. ACT 8 (1947); CCH, A
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND PROCEDURE BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES 135-226 (1948); Vander-
bilt, Legislative Background of the Federal Adinistrative Procedure Act in THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT AND THE ADmINIsTRATV AGENCIES 1-15 (Warren ed.
1947). And see the narration of the legislative history in the Wong case cited note 35
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created by the late President Roosevelt. This Committee issued numerous
studies and a report, which were transmitted by the President to Congress in
1937.6 The report recommended, among other things, a complete separation
of the legislative from the judicial functions in every agency exercising both.
In 1938 the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on a proposal for the
establishment of an administrative court.7 These ideas, however, proved too
radical a departure from the customary American legal standards and were
later abandoned. The year 1939 saw the Walter-Logan bill,8 which attempted
to reach and control the administrative process at its source. It was-or rather
tried to be-a comprehensive reform of the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
procedures. The bill was vetoed by the President, chiefly because he had mean-
while directed the appointment of another committee for further studies and
recommendations. 9 In 1941 this committee issued its "Final Report of Attor-
ney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,"'1 a document of
great importance for the understanding of administrative-legal problems.,
The Committee also issued 27 separate studies of 33 different administrative
agencies.
12
The Final Report and the individual studies are the overture to the present
law. As a result of them, the so-called majority and minority bills were intro-
duced in the Senate, along with revised versions of other bills.3 Extensive
hearings were held before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
early in 1941.14 The war interrupted. New bills were introduced in June
1944 and thereafter,'0 and eventually in June 1945 a committee print was
issued comparing the text of the final bill ' 6 with tentative revisions.' 7 Hear-
ings were held by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.' s
infra. For still earlier proposals see SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 63, 188; Vanderbilt, supra,
at 10.
6. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE
CoMuTTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT (1937).
7. S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d SEss. (1938).
8. SEN. REP. No. 442, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ; H. R. REp. No. 1149, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939) ; SEN. Doc. No. 145, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). See also SEN. Doc. No.
248, at 243-5.
9. H. R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
10. SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
11. A deficiency, however, is the lack of an index.
12. SEN. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941). And see SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 68, 245.
13. S. 674, 675, 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
14. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, 675 and 918, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941).
15. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 63-6, 248.
16. This was the McCarran-Sumners bill that is the basis of the present Act. S. 7 and
H. R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
17. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 11-44.
18. Id. at 45-183.
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In October 1945 the Attorney-General submitted a letter and memorandum
setting forth the understanding of the Department of Justice as to the meaning
and purpose of the various provisions of the revised bill.19 In November 1945
and May 1946, the judiciary committees of both Houses of Congress unani-
mously reported the bill. The reports consist of brief resum6s of the legislative
history, a general statement of the committee's approach, comparisons of the
bill and its forerunners with the Final Report referred to above, 0 diagrams,
analyses of the individual provisions, and general comments. 21 After further
changes of the bill in the judiciary committees of both Houses, the bill was
debated and amended in the Senate on March 12, and debated and again
amended in the House on May 24, 1946. On May 27 the Senate concurred
in the House changes. The bill was signed by the President on June 11, 1946.22
It became effective three months later, i.e., on September 11, 1946.23
Like any other statute, an analysis of the Act presents us essentially with
two questions: What was the purpose of the Act, and what did it accomplish?
The basic purpose of the APA was obviously the wish to bring about, some-
how, a curb of the administrative branch of our government-to see to it
"that the governors shall be governed and the regulators shall be regulated."
24
Its passage in part at least was due to the deep yearning of the traditional
lawyer "for the comparatively simple life of yesteryear '25 and his desire to
put brakes on any new development in the law that disturbed his accustomed
way of doing business. 26 The main protagonist of this yearning was the Amer-
ican Bar AssociationY.2  Its efforts met with opposition from administrative
agencies and their lawyers as well as from administrative theoreticians. 28 And
19. Id. at 406-14; ATrY. GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. AcT 123-39 (1947).
20. See Note 10 supra.
21. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 185-231, 233-90.
22. 92 CONG. REc. 2148-67, 5645-63, 5745, 5788-91, 5811, 5954, 6073, 6706 (March 12,
May 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, June 12, 1946) ; SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 293-406.
23. APA § 12. The effect of certain of its provisions was deferred. As to the Act's
applicability to proceedings initiated prior to its effective date, see Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127, 138 (1947), and Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion, id. at 147.
24: SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 244.
25. Id. at 243.
26. It is generally agreed that the opposition of professional real property lawyers is
a main reason why the Torrens system of land recordation has been so unsuccessful in this
country. Professor Paul Koschaker, in his recent classic, EUROPA UND DAS ROEMISCHE
RECHT (1947), makes the point that the chief reason for the rejection of Roman law in
England was the resistance of the legal profession, which saw its traditional ways dis-
turbed. See this writer's review in 42 Am. J. INTL. L. 975 (1948).
27. See SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 63-6, and passim; Blachly, Critique of the Federal Ad-
ininistrative Act in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIv PROcEDURE Acr AND THE ADmINIsTRA-
TIW AGENciES 30 (Warren ed. 1947) ; Gwynne, Architecture of the New Adnistrative
Procedure Act, 32 A. B. A. J. 550 (1946).
28. See supra; note 14; SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 247-48, 392; Blachly & Oatman, Sabo-
tage of the Administrative Process, 6 PuB. ADmIN. REv. 213 (1946). And see Blachly,
supra note 27.
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while the deliberations went on, the courts gained in understanding of ad-
ministrative-legal problems.2' The result of these conflicting currents was the
present Act, which was conceded to be somewhat less far-reaching than its first
proponents wanted.30 Some opponents greeted the new law with the same
vehement antipathy with which they had opposed the prior bills.
3l Other
critics were more or less satisfied with the comparatively small innovations the
Act brought about.32 The Act thus had lukewarm as well as hot support.
33
At the outset it is clear that, despite its title, the Act does not endeavor to
regulate the-i.e., every-administrative procedure. The APA is merely
directed at rule making and the adjudication of individual cases as well as
certain matters ancillary to both. It is probably neither possible nor desirable
to regulate the many other administrative functions of the Government, such
as the managerial and custodial acts performed by the National Archives or
the Public Building Administration, the very important task of preparing the
nation's budget, or the activities of the Office of Education. Some proponents
of the new law made allusion to the "barnacle growth" of the administrative
branch, which supposedly endangers our ship of state and which constitutes a
fourth "headless" branch of government. 34  The legislators have not seen fit
to do anything about it. The APA neither reduces the number of administrative
agencies, nor prevents their growth, nor changes their powers materially, nor
subjects them to the control of either the President or the Congress to a greater
extent than heretofore.
Within the limited scope of what the Act is intended to do, its most fre-
quently-named goals 35 are the codification of administrative procedure ;36 the
29. E.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943); NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944). Cf. McFarland, Discussion, in THE FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TITIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMInNIsTRATIVE AGENmES 69 (Warren ed. 1947)
(Dobson rule has remained unchanged).
30. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 188-91, 243, 247-9.
31. Blachly, supra note 27; Blachly, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34
GEo. L.J. 407 (1946) ; Blachly & Oatman, supra note 28. And see also Hart, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 627-8.
32. See, e. g., note 4 supra.
33. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
34. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 338.
35. The APA's "legislative history is more conflicting than the text is ambiguous."
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49 (1950) ; "Congress expressed a mood."
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 487 (1951). See SEN. Doc. No. 248,
at 303-4. Senator McCarran (not a specification of the details of administrative pro-
cedure, nor a codification; merely "an outline of minimum basic essentials"); id. at 407,
Attorney General Clark (there is nothing inherent in the subject of administrative law
"which defies workable codification"); id. at 298, Senator McCarran (a "bill of rights
for . . . Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated . . . by agencies . . .; a
simple and standardized plan of administrative procedure") ; id. at 307, Senator McCarran
(nothing in the bill that interferes with existing administrative procedure) ; id. at 318-19,
Senators McCarran and McKellar ("principal purpose of the bill" as well as its "general
underlying purpose" is to afford aggrieved parties judicial review) ; id. at 347, Congress-
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achievement of uniformity, standardization, and simplification ;37 the curbing
of administrative excesses ;38 and the publicizing of administrative acts.30 The
Act is also supposed to require agencies to base their determination on "some-
thing' more than 'any evidence' ";40 to "allow persons who are aggrieved as
the result of acts of governmental agencies to appeal to the courts" ;41 to estab-
lish a uniform system of judicial review for "every legal wrong" committed by
agencies ;42 and to provide for an "outline of minimum basic essentials" of
administrative procedure. 43 Even a limited analysis of the problems of ad-
ministrative law shows that the Act is far away from these goals.
44
The Administrative Procedure Act is anything but a codification either of
administrative procedure as such or of those types of rule making and ad-
judication to which the Act applies.4 5  A code or similar comprehensive body
of law would name the instances when, in adjudicatory proceedings, hearings
are required, whereas the APA leaves this supreme question to existing law.40
A code would rule in which cases what modes of notice are required,47 but
the APA merely restates in a general fashion that parties must be informed
man Pittenger (same); id. at 345-7, Congressmen Sabath and Michener (to improve
administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure; to see that the
people receive justice). Etc.
36. Id. at 298, 349, 407.
37. Id. at 243, 379-80. See also Justice Jackson for the Court in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
38. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 243-4, 249, 337-8 (the "barnacle growth" of the executive
branch).
39. Id. at 251, 304, 346, 348, 353, 356-8.
40. Id. at 321.
41. Id. at 318-19, 347.
42. Id. at 305, 308-10, 354, 368.
43. Id. at 303-4.
44. Savigny wrote in 1814 that the time had to be "ripe" for a codification of law-
i.e., that a given branch of law had to be sufficiently advanced to be capable of being re-
stated, or where desirable, remodeled in detail. American administrative law, with its
tremendous vagueness, is the perfect example of a branch of law which fails to meet
these requirements. See FmEDmicH KARL voNr SAVIGNY, Vom BEEtuF UNSRER ZEIT FUE
GESETGEBUNG uxn REcHTSWISSENSCHAFT (3d ed. 1840). There exist several English
translations. For a good recent evaluation see KOScHAER, op. cit. supra note 26, at
258-9.
45. For a competent evaluation of the possibilities of an administrative-legal code see
the report in REP. AT'Y. GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 191-2 (1941).
46. APA § 5, first sentence. The legislative language and intent confine the applica-
bility of § 5 to cases where hearing is required by statute. SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 21, 202,
260, 359. But the Wong decision, supra note 35, broadens this to mean any law, as dis-
tinguished from mere custom or a regulation the making of which is not imposed upon the
agency by law. This was followed in Riss & Co. v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 620 (1951).
47. Notice, to comply with due process, may be given by the pertinent statute itself.
Lander v. Mercantile Bank, 186 U.S. 458 (1902); Pittsburgh, C., Ch. & St L. Ry. v.
Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894). And see Anderson Natl. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1944) (notice by publication) ; Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (class action).
1951]
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of time, place and nature of the hearing,48 leaving the question of sufficiency
again to "the law." In a century or so we might be able to say exactly who
is to be a "party" in administrative proceedings, but at the present the APA
merely says in so many words that a party is anybody who is entitled (that
is, of course, under "the law") to be a party.49 Similarly, the problem of who
has standing to seek judicial review is inadequately answered by merely saying,
anybody "suffering legal wrong" or being "adversely affected or aggrieved"
within the meaning of the law.50 Perhaps the time will never come when we
can spell out the details of these general, vague norms in the same fashion as,
say, the hearsay rule. It certainly is not here yet.
The demand for uniformity, standardization and hence simplification has
fared not much better. The variance between rules of procedure of the
several agencies is probably not as great as many people seemed to have
imagined,51 but the APA does not lessen it anyway. The issues whether in a
given case there must be a hearing and if so, who is entitled to it, and whether
it must be oral, etc., are left unanswered. 2 The Act does strengthen certain
principles such as the separation of functions of judge and advocate or that
the one who hears must himself at least recommend a decision.53 But these
and other innovations apply only where the Act in general and the hearing
provisions in particular apply, and where none of the many exceptions lie. 4
The law is now not much more uniform in these regards than it was before the
APA. Nor has the rule making procedure been standardized. There are now,
as ever, a great many types of permissible procedures in rule making: where
no part of the Act applies ;55 where only Section 3, dealing with publication
of rules, applies;56 where the procedure of Section 4 (a) and (b), first sen-
48. APA § 5 (a). The requirement of clause (2), whereby the notice must give the
"legal authority and jurisdiction" under which the hearing is to be held is a commendable
innovation.
49. See the discussion of the term "party" in APA § 2 (b), at notes 112-16 infra.
50. APA § 10 (a). Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (Section 10), Background and Effect in THE FEDERAL ADmINIs-
TRATIVE PRocEDuRE ACT AND THE ADMnisTRATv AGENCIES 546 (Warren ed. 1947),
believes that § 10 is an improvement of the law. Many of his views, however, are not
embodied within the four corners of the Act and, consequently, have not been followed by
the courts or agencies.
51. Blachly, supra note 27. But see SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 243, 348.
52. Cf. the discussion in WJR, The Goodwill Station v. FCC, 174 F. 2d 226 (D.C.
Cir., 1948), reversed sub. nom. FCC v. WJR, 337 U. S. 265 (1949); Philadelphia Co.
v. SEC, infra note 121.
53. APA § 2 (a), a somewhat diluted version of the postulate, "the one who decides
must hear" of Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
54. APA §2 (a), as amended; §5, first sentence; §8 (a), last sentence. And see
notes 104-111 infra.
55. I.e., not even § 3: functions requiring secrecy or relating solely to internal man-
agement. APA § 3, first sentence.
56. Because the agency is otherwise exempted from the APA under §2 (a), as
amended.
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tence, would per se apply, but the agency for "good cause" finds its application
impracticable ;57 where the enabling statute requires that the regulation be
made only upon the record of a formal hearing; l8 and lastly, where the en-
abling statute merely demands a "hearing," but does not provide that the
regulation must be based upon the record of the hearing.59 The principal
stride towards standardization is a minor one-the mandate that in dubio
the consultative procedure of Sections .4 (a) and (b), first sentence, is to
apply.
Where the Act changes rather than restates the law, it naturally curbs
administrative agencies to a certain degree. Thus, if none of the exceptions
are applicable, an adjudicatory hearing must now be given by an examiner
qualified under Section 11. The rule making process must be conducted so
as to give parties interested an opportunity to express their views. And the
right of parties to have counsel and to be issued subpoenas is established
beyond doubt as far as the Act goes.60 To some extent then, administrative
law has been changed to favor private parties and limit the freedom with which
agencies can act.61
These limited changes, however, do not come close to an effective curb
of the administrative branch of the Government as such. The governors are
now not essentially more governed, nor the regulators regulated, 2 than before.
Administrative agencies flourish as ever and the APA has neither diminished
their number nor curtailed their various, heterogenous purposes. Such rules
as that of primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and
substantial evidence, which have strengthened agencies' position so much
during the last decades remain untouched. Nor has the Act diminished the
force of the most recent judge-made administrative legal doctrine, giving
preponderant weight to agency holdings involving both so-called mixed ques-
tions and the agency's qualified experience.6 3 Unchanged is the broad power
of delegated legislation, at one time so obnoxious to many traditional lawyers.
Agencies make rules, pursuant to wide statutory authority, as they see fit
57. APA § 4 (a), last sentence.
58. Id. § 4 (b), second sentence.
59. ATT. GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. Acr 34-5 (1947); Reich, infra note 118, at 501-504.
And see Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
60. § 6(a) and (c).
61. By using these words, however, I do not mean to join in the somewhat naive
language of many that regard agencies as parties to whose "advantage" or "disadvantage"
law may be enacted. Rather, they are public authorities, charged with representing the
people.
62. See note 24 supra.
63. Justice Douglas, concurring in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 70 S.
Ct. 955, 971, 974 (1950) : "This Court has often emphasized that weight is to be given
to the interpretation of statute made by the administrative agency." (Citing, inter alia, the
Hearst case, supra note 29). And see McFarland's remark, supra note 29.
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and the courts, as a rule, do not interfere. 64 Nor does the Administrative
Procedure Act.
It has been asserted that the Act imposes publicity on administrative
agencies.1 Actually, however, this was done by the establishment of the
Federal Register ten years before the APA, at least as far as regulations are
concerned. 6 The present law, it is true, applies also to orders, which must
generally be open to public inspection. Matters of official record must be
made available to parties concerned.6 7 This was in conformity with good
practice even before the APA,68 but of course it is an improvement to have
it in the statute book. As to regulations, the Act differs from the Federal
Register Act but in two regards. It is retroactive, as far as procedural and
organizational regulations are concerned, 69 and it includes in the material
that must be published-though not retroactively--"statements of general
policy or interpretation." 70 The agencies throughout the land complied with
the former provision by publishing all their rules of procedure and their or-
ganization in the Federal Register of September 11, 1946,"- which consisted
of nearly 1000 pages fine print. I do not think it was read by many people. 72
The wisdom of requiring the inclusion of mere interpretations in the Register
is subject to doubt.73 The sanction on failure to publish a regulation in the
Register means, briefly, that it cannot be enforced. Since an interpretation
is by its nature not enforced anyway, the provision requiring its publication is
meaningless, to be followed or not at will.
74
64. See, e.g., cases cited, note 130 infra.
65. See note 39 .spra.
66. Fed. Reg. Act, 49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 1950). For an
analysis of the present and past unsatisfactory situation see Newman, Government and
Ignorance-Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HAxv. L. REv.
929 (1950).
67. APA § 3(b), (c). Matters of a confidential nature are excepted.
68. Cf. REP. ATrTy. GEr. Comm. AD. Paoc. 25, 29-30 (1941).
69. § 3(a) (1) and (2), applying to rules of procedure and organization that existed at
the time when the Act went into effect.
70. § 3(a) (3).
71. The statements relating the agencies' organizations have not been included in the
Code of Federal Regulations. 1 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 1.43, 1.45 (a) (1949); 13 FED. REG.
5931 (1948) ; Newman, supra note 66, at 949 (1950) ; McCarran, supra note 3, at 577.
72. The "monster edition" of the Federal Register. McCarran, supra note 3, at 576.
"To place information regarding the governmental agencies in the Federal Register is to
make it unavailable to most people.. . ." Blachley, supra note 27, at 49.
73. For a further discussion of the difference between a regulation and an interpre-
tative statement, see notes 117-34 infra.
74. Thus, as is generally known, many Internal Revenue interpretations-often called
"rulings," "opinions," etc.-are not published in the Register. Dwan, The Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in THE FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINIsTRATIvE AGENCIES 144-50, 162, 168 (Warren
ed. 1947).
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A reader of the legislative history of the Act must get the impression that
in the past "any evidence, or a scintilla of evidence, as it is sometimes defined"
was considered sufficient for sustaining an administrative decision, and that
the APA now does away with this by subjecting to court review decisions
that are not based on substantial evidence.75 Exactly the opposite is true.76
Heralded as a change, this provision is but little more than a codification of the
Consolidated Edison case,77 where the Supreme Court made it clear that a
decision not based on substantial evidence will not be upheld, despite the fact
that the pertinent Section 10(e) of the Wagner Act, under which the case
arose, merely provided that the findings of the Board must be upheld if sup-
ported "by evidence."78s In so holding the Court added that "substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla." 79 The process by which this unequivo-
cal statement that a mere scintilla is never sufficient-from which derive all the
"scintilla" allusions in subsequent decisons involving administrative law 80
crept into both Houses of Congress as support for the contrary proposition 8 1
is not clear.
If it is true that allowing parties to seek judicial review is "the principal
purpose of the bill,"82 the Act accomplishes very little. Court control, by and
75. See text at note 40 supra. For more congressional remarks see SEN. Doc. No. 248,
at 386 (Congressman Russell: "if the proposed provision becomes law'--as it did, § 10 (e)
(5)-then "the law making that scintilla of evidence binding upon the court" will remain
as it is). And see note 81 infra.
76. The origin of the "scintilla" phrase is obscure. See Offutt v. World's Columbian
Exposition, 175 Ill. 472, 476, 51 N.E. 651, 652 (1898).
77. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). And see, e.g.,
NLTRIB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F. 2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1943); Matter of
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273-4, 26 N.E. 2d 247, 255 (1940). See
also note 81 infra.
78. NLRA § 10 (e), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, now says "substantial evi-
dence." The extent, if any, to which the Universal Camera case, supra note 35, has
wrought a true change of the law is not yet visible. See also HART, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 677-8.
79. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, supra note 77, at 229.
80. E.g., cases in, note 77 supra, or the Bridges case, infra note 81.
81. The above-quoted language was used in the Senate. See note 40 supra. In the
House, Congressman Walter seems to have entertained a similar opinion: "Under this
section the function of the courts is not merely to search the record to see whether it is
barren of any evidence ... or supports the agency by a scintilla or by mere hearsay,
rumor, suspicion, speculation, and inference-cf. Edison Co. v. Labor Board (305 U.S. 197,
229-30). Under this bill it will not be sufficient for the Court to find, as the late Chief
Justice Stone pointed out within the year, merely that there is some 'tenuous support of
evidence'-Bridges v. Wixon, (326 U.S. at 178)." SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 370. Actually,
however, Chief Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in the Bridges case, 326 U.S. 135, 166
(1945), is clearly intended to remind the Court of the rule "which it has followed for
many years" that, when there is "evidence more than a scintilla" to support an agency
finding, the courts will uphold it. And see Congressman Russell, .rupra note 75. Con-
gressional statements like these render questionable the correctness of the repeated asser-
tion that the Act is the product of careful, elaborate studies.
82. See notes 41, 42 supra.
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large, existed prior to the Act where it exists now, except perhaps for de-
portation cases where under the old law only habeas corpus was available.
8 3
This relatively small change in the law could have been accomplished by a
simple amendment to the Immigration Act.84 The new law does no more than
restate the wide and vague grounds upon which judicial review may be sought.8 5
It might have brought about a measure of uniformity-really not of administra-
tive but of judicial law-by replacing the various forms of action for judicial
review by one petition for judicial review. It did not. It preserves both the
existing statutory actions for judicial review (which often simply provide for
a petition for review) and in their absence or inadequacy the non-statutory
common-law writs.s
Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that the APA is altogether
useless. It has brought several clarifications and improvements. The adoption
of the substantial evidence rule, for instance, has put to rest many, though not
all old arguments. Prior to the Act there existed some holdings that could
be cited in favor of the so-called review of the record rule, whereby the review
court, without holding a trial de novo, yet reviewed and weighed the evidence
upon the record.8 7 Apart from trials de novo, which the Act expressly
preserves, 8 the law now is to the effect that courts may not reappraise the
evidence that was before the agency. Rather, the review court is bound to
accept it if it is substantial.8 9 The establishment of independent trial examiners
can be greeted as a step forward, particularly in a governmental system where
otherwise the tenure of office of the civil servants is without efficient protec-
83. See the Bridges case, supra note 81. And see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950). A comparison between the two decisions reveals no world-shaking
improvement of the deportees' rights.
84. It is not entirely clear how this provision got in anyway. One of the Act's main
proponents was Senator McCarran, not otherwise known for friendly sentiments toward
prospective deportees. Bills have been introduced to exempt deportation proceedings from
the Act. S. 2755 and H. R. 6652, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. 10, 81st Cong., Ist
Sess. § 2 (1949).
85. APA § 10. And see McFarland's remarks, supra note 29, which confirm that there
is no change in the law of judicial review even in the hotly contested field of "mixed"
questions.
86. APA § 10 (b) ; SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 325-6. For a comprehensive study see Dick-
inson, supra note 89.
87. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1935).
88. APA §§ 5 (1, 10 (e) (6). But the Act, rather typically, fails to explain when
a trial is de novo. Cf. Parker, Administrative Law in Arkansas, 4 ARK. L. REv. 107,
125-7 (1950).
89. United States v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186,
193 (1950); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1949);
United States ex rel. Lindeman v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). CARROw,
BACKGROUND OF ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 155-7 (1948). But see Dickinson, The Judicial
Review Provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in THE FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADmiSTRATIVE AGENcIES 546, 554-62, 578-89 (War-
ren ed. 1947). But see the Universal Camera case, supra notes 35, 78.
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tion.90 No world-shaking effects have resulted from the requirement that
regulations ought to be made after giving interested quarters an opportunity
for consultation, but this provision also may be considered an improvement.D'
While the Act can be said to be barely an outline of even a minimum of
essentials that are basic,92 it does inch forward in that direction .3  Lack of
space, however, forbids a complete analysis of how much is changed in the
eleven sections of the Act, and how much constitutes merely codification of
vagueness. Yet, the usefulness and quality of a statute can often be deduced
from an examination of its definitions. If clarity exists here, it follows that
the law has contributed to the elimination of at least some controversial issues.
If, on the other hand, the definition of terms that are frequently used in the
statute clarifies nothing, or even perchance increases existing doubts, the
statute cannot easily constitute a technical improvement of the law. And as
a technical improvement is the essence of a procedural statute, we may confine
our further inquiry to Section 2 of the Act, which contains definitions.
Subsection (a). This defines the term "agency," states that statutory delega-
tions of authority remain unchanged, and lists the agencies that are excluded
from the operation of the Act.
A. "Agency" is defined as "each authority (whether or not within or subject
to review by another agency) of the Government" other than Congress, courts,
or the governments of the possessions, territories, or the District of Columbia.
This leaves in doubt the principal issues it is designed to clarify:
(1) The definitional scheme is a negative one, depending mainly on saying
what an "agency" is not. What one is, is so broadly stated as to breed confusion.
For example, the President of the United States, though definitely neither Con-
gress nor a court, does not seem to fall under the APA. This is of major im-
portance to the rule making process. The Chief Executive does not usually
90. Carter v. Forrestal, 175 F. 2d 364, 365 (D. C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
832, (1949) (dismissal from Civil Service will not be judicially reviewed) ; Groghan v.
United States, 89 F. Supp. 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1950), citing many cases; Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F. 2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by equally diided court, 19 U.S.L. WEux 3296
(U.S. May 1, 1951) (dismissal from Civil Service for loyalty reasons without due process
valid).
91. Which, however, must not be overrated. Cf. Lansden v. Hart, 168 F. 2d 409
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948) (approving notice of proposed rule-
making that was given six days prior to, and a hearing thereon after, the publication
of the rule). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1949, in § 7 (d) (3) (b), authorizes
certain regulations concerning profit sharing plans; the statute became law on October
26, 1949, and went into effect January 25, 1950; and only on that day did the Wage
and Hour Administrator publish the regulation, stating that the fact that the FLSA went
into effect the same day made it necessary to promulgate the regulation with immediate
effect, without benefit of pre-publication, consultation, etc. 15 FED. REG. 401 (1950). The
Administrator fails to explain why it was necessary to wait until the rule making pro-
cedure of APA §4 (a), (b) became impracticable.
92. See note 43 supra.
93. Some of its proponents thought that the Act is "not the final answer ...we
will taken another step next year . . ." SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 338.
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decide individual cases,94 and where he does the adjudicatory process would be
inapplicable in view of the first sentence of APA Section 5.95 On the other
hand, there is nothing in the language of either the Act or its history that would
exclude the President's rule making functions from the operation of the Act. In
fact, of course, the Executive orders of the President, as his regulations are
called, are not made pursuant to Section 4. The President has never announced
in the Federal Register intention to make a regulation; nor has he afforded
interested parties an opportunity of expressing their views on the proposed reg-
ulation. Moreover, his Executive Orders are covered by the Federal Register
Act 01 and published pursuant to that statute rather than APA Section 3 (a) (3).
As a result, the President does not publish in the Federal Register his "state-
ments of general policy," as Section 3(a) (3) decrees.97
The example chosen may seem far-fetched. Anyone can infer that the Act
is not to apply to the President. But the purpose of statutory definition is
to be precise. Any definitional section may raise difficulties in border-line
cases. One that does not solve even obvious cases falls far short of its
objective.
(2) It has always been clear that a "court" is not an administrative agency.
To know this is useful, however, only if you know what a "court" is. The APA
fails to define the term. The difference between the two types of governmental,
law-applying authorities-courts and agencies-is one of shades rather than
absolutes. Legal theory characterizes courts as endowed with "independence,"
that is, as subject merely to the law and not to the instructions or policies of
superior organs.98 It is obvious that this distinction cannot be applied here. If
it were, much of the APA would be superfluous, for the Act aims particularly
at the adjudicatory agencies, such as the NLRB or the FTC, which enjoy the
94. There are some exceptions. E. g., §§ 801, 1006 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52
STAT. 1014 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. 601, 646 (Supp. 1951) ; Chicago & Southern Air Lines
v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948), 61 HARv. L. Rav. 1053.
95. In view of the interpretation, however, which the Wong Yang Sung case, supra
note 35, has given APA § 5, the President one day may find himself confronted with
the demand that he comply with this section whenever he decides upon a case, see note
94 supra, where "the law" requires a hearing.
96. FEDERAL REalsTm Acr §5, 49 STAT. 501 (1935), 44 U. S. C. 305 (1946). The
procedure of publishing Executive Orders is regulated in Exec. Order No. 7298 (1936)
and Exec. Order No. 10,006 (1948), 13 FED. REaG. 5927 (1948), 1 CODE FED. REG.
1.91-1.97 (1949).
97. It is worth observing, however, that the "monster edition" of the FEDERAL
REGIST R of September 11, 1946, does contain a very brief statement of the "organiza-
tion" of the Executive Office of the President. This might be regarded as a tentative
compliance with APA §3 (a) (1). As to his "functions," see APA §3 (a) (2),
however, there is, in lieu of a description, merely the statement that the President
has directed that this information "be included in the explanation of the organization and
procedures of the respective agencies of the Executive Branch which administer such
functions on behalf of the President . . . "
98. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 275 (1945).
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independence that is the theoretical criterion of courts. The line, then, cannot
be drawn from legal theory. The term "court" must rather be conceived as
meaning "court within the positive law": whatever is statutorily assigned to
the judicial branch of government is a "court." This is true not only of the
"constitutional" courts,90 but also of the statutory courts under the Judiciary
Code, 0 0 such as the courts of appeal, the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, and the Customs Court.' 0 ' On the other hand, agencies
both exercising judicial (often called quasi-judicial) functions and enjoying
judicial independence, but not designated as falling within the purview of the
judiciary, are probably not "courts" within Section 2 (a). Into this category
falls the Tax Court, which, despite its name, 0 2 is not organized under the Ju-
dicial Code and is statutorily defined as "an independent agency in the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government."
0 3
B. Subsection (a), with its mass of amendments, includes a formidable list of
agencies that are excluded from the operation of the Act (except as to Section
3). Some of the exempted agencies may rightly be regarded as organically not
fitting into the pattern of the Act. Disputes where the parties' agents take part,
as judges, in making the decision,'0 4 are akin to arbitration proceedings, which
traditionally are not circumscribed by procedural rules. The exclusion of the
military functions '05 can be ascribed to the fact that nowadays we do not con-
sider acts of, or pertaining to, the armed forces as coming under administrative
law,106 and that military necessity and expediency may be guided by the same
99. As established by direct mandate of U. S. CONsT. Art. III. For the distinction
between constitutional and legislative courts, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S.
438 (1929) ; Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930);
Federal Radio Commission v. Helson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266
(1933) ; O'Donoghue v. United States 289 U. S. 516 (1933); Williams v. United States,
289 U. S. 553 (1933).
100. 28 U. S. C.
101. Id. §§ 41-255. And see Schwartz, infra note 103.
102. Its forerunner was the Board of Tax Appeals. See note 103 infra.
103. Internal Revenue Code § 1100, as amended by § 504 of the Revenue Act
of 1942, 56 STAT. 798 (1942), 26 U. S. C. § 1100 (1946), Lincoln Electric Co. v. Comm'r.,
162 F. 2d 379, (6th Cir. 1947) ; Gillette's Estate v. Comm'r., 182 F. 2d 1010, 1013 (9th
Cir. 1950). And see Cohen v. Comm'r., 176 F. 2d 394, 396 (10th Cir. 1949). Contra:
Anderson v. Comm'r., 164 F. 2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1947); Atty. Gen. in SEN. Doc. No.
248, at 225, 408; ATTY. GEN. MAN. at 10. And see Schwartz, Administrative Term-
inology and the Administrative Procedure Act, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 57, 61-2 (1949). For
a similar problem under state law see Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co., 2 N. J. 356 (Sup. Ct.), 66 A. 2d 726 (1949).
104. APA §2(a)(1).
105. Id. § 2(a) (2), (3), and (4).
106. Historically, the military and foreign affairs function of the chief of state
were the starting point, so to speak, for Locke's and Montesquien's separation of
powers doctrines. See Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited: Its Meaning to
Administrative Law, 49 MicE. L. REv. 1010 (1951).
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rules of procedure that apply to the civil functions of the Government. The
exclusion of the remaining agencies and their procedures, however, is based on
somewhat less convincing grounds. Despite the fact that it was the war agen-
des which gave rise to the most outspoken complaints and criticism,10 7 they
are excluded on the ground that they are merely temporary whereas the Act
was intended to be permanent legislation; and that, in any event, "those agencies
are erected under orders and statutes that provide a special method of review
of their decision."' 03  Neither argument is convincing. For one thing, the
premise of temporariness appears factually untrue.10 9 For another, the policy
is unclear. If the APA constitutes an improvement, why not apply it to tem-
porary agencies? And the second argument could be applied to all agencies.
Most enabling statutes provide for a special method of judicial review of the
respective agency's decisions. A more realistic reason for excluding war and
emergency agencies from the operation of the Act might be that, despite inten-
tions and assertions to the contrary, the APA neither simplifies nor materially
standardizes administrative procedures, but rather makes them often more cum-
bersome, and that therefore agencies destined to cope with emergency situations
should be freed from its application. If such a reason existed, it was, of course,
never made explicit.
The usefulness of Section 2 (a) is further reduced by the fact that the absence
of any agency from the amended list of exceptions does not necessarily indicate
that the Act applies to its procedures. For example, civil service procedures
are exempted from the rule making procedure of the APA by Section 4, first
sentence; from the adjudicatory procedure of Section 5, since that section ap-
plies only where hearings are required by statute ;110 and, at least in the opinion
of the Civil Service Commission, from the publicity requirements under Section
3(a). i l l
Subsection (b). This section purports to define "party. ' ' 1 2  It constitutes
a good example of what administrative lawmaking cannot accomplish. The Act
provides in so many words that a party is a person or agency named or admitted
107. SEN. Dorm No. 248, at 387.
108. Ibid.
109. The most recent statute adding another exemption to the list is § 709 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950.
110. See note 90 supra.
111. According to official interpretation, the exception of APA §3, first sentence,
which exempts from publication "any matter relating solely to the internal management
of an agency," includes "not only intra-agency personnel but also government personnel
generally," despite the fact that this section speaks of "internal" management, whereas
§4, first sentence, referred to in the text above, exempts "agency management or
personnel" in general. Letter of the U. S. Civil Service Commission to this author,
dated April 10, 1950, File CL:AK :bh; A=. GEN. MAN. at 18, 27.
112. It also defines "person," but no significant controversy exists here as to the
meaning of that term.
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or entitled to be a party.113 This definition bypasses the one problem whose
solution a naive optimist might have expected: the question as to who has
standing in an administrative procedure. The APA simply refers to the exist-
ing law with its many conflicting answers.1 1 4 The same technique is employed,
incidentally, in the judicial review section of the Act, which entitles him to court
review who "suffers legal wrong," or is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by
agency action."15 But here again "legal wrong" means wrong under "the law"
-not necessarily the APA,--and so does "adversely affected or aggrieved. ' '116
I am fully aware that it is probably not possible to state who has and who has
not standing before an agency or review court with the same clarity as do the
laws of civil and criminal court procedure. But this, indeed, is the very point:
that administrative procedure is not, or not yet, capable of true restatement,
generalities in the APA notwithstanding.
Subsections (c) and (d). Whereas subsection (b) is harmless albeit useless,
the same cannot be said of subsections (c) and (d), which are devoted to defin-
ing "rule" and "rule making" on the one hand and "order" and "adjudication"
on the other. The Act fails to draw a clear line, or indeed any line at that,
between the two categories of norms. From the legislative history as well as the
remarks of official and semi-official commentators it appears that the definitions
are based on the belief (1) that there exists a "fundamental distinction" between
rule making and adjudications ;117 and (2) that the Act not only makes this
clear but also prescribes "radically different procedures" for either type of ad-
ministrative procedure."18 Unfortunately, none of these assumptions are ten-
able.
(1) The difference between the various kinds of norms, including laws, reg-
ulations, and decisions, is gradual and not categorical. Statutes are often, but
not inevitably, of wide application. Regulations usually-but again not neces-
sarily-apply to more limited groups of persons or situations. Decisions, in
113. "Party" includes "any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party..." And see SEN. Doc. No.
248, at 196-7, 253.
114. For some of the problems involved see Davis, Standing to Challenge and
Enforce Administrative Action, 49 CoL. L. REv. 759 (1949) ; GEU.EHoRN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 400-428 (1947), quoting well-selected cases.
115. APA § 10 (a).
116. Cf. the discussion in SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 308-10.
117. ATTY. GEN. MAN. at 7; REP. ATTY. GEN. Com. AD. PRoc. 1, 2, 5 (1941) ; SEN.
Doc. No. 248. at 254, 355 But see notes 135-6 infra.
118. ArY. GEN. MAN. at 12-16; SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 251, 254, 355; McFarland,
Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in THE: FEDERAL. ADMINISTRATIVE
PRO EDuRE AcT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcEs 24 (Warren ed. 1947). But see Reich,
Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure Act in id. at 492-5, 510-14; Schwartz,
supra note 103, at 67; Ginnane, "Rile Making," "Adjudication," and Exemptions Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 621 624-7 1947; Note, 56 YAI.E
L. J. 670, 678-81 (1947).
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turn, are usually immediately applicable to but one or two parties.119 Yet a
decree in the bankruptcy proceedings of a giant corporation may affect hundreds
of thousands of creditors and shareholders. A generally worded transportation
regulation, on the other hand, may in fact address itself to the only bus line in
the state. Still less fruitful must be any attempt to recognize laws and regula-
tions by their future applicability and decisions by their supposed reference to
the past. For decisions are norms, in that they establish a legal duty or, which
is the same thing, command somebody to do or refrain from doing something.
Hence, they must logically "refer" to the future just as much as regulations.
This is abundantly clear whenever such equity decrees as for a divorce, alimony,
the abatement of a nuisance, or the cancelation of a deed, are involved. Even a
money judgment is prospective, for while it implicitly repeats that there has
existed A's duty to pay B, it establishes A's duty anew, which is now a duty
under the judgment rather than under the contract between A and B. There is
no categorical difference between such a judgment and a regulation that "carries
out" the provisions of a statute. Nor can an essential criterion be established by
saying that only a decision is based on facts in the past. The judge decides on
facts, as he sees them, that have occurred in the past, and so does the lawmaker.
It is almost axiomatic to say that the making of a new law (or regulation) pre-
supposes the existence of a "mischief,"' 120 that is, of a set of pre-existing facts
that the lawgiver desires to do away with.
As long as laws are made by legislatures alone, the difference could be drawn
quite easily from a purely mechanical, jurisdictional point of view: whatever
the legislature enacts is a statute even though it be a so-called private act, which
is substantially nothing but an individual decision emanating from the legisla-
ture. Conversely, only what the legislature does could be "laws" under this ap-
proach. Nowadays, however, general norms are often made by the same organ
that is also authorized to render individual decisions. These general norms-
regulations--can be readily distinguished from statutes: the latter are made by
the legislature, the former by agencies. But how is one to distinguish the regu-
lations from the decisions that emanate from the same agency? As the distinc-
tion cannot be categorical, we must satisfy ourselves with a few quantitative
criteria.121 Regulations may be said to differ from orders in that the former lay
down rules for a group of people whose number is more or less indefinite and
whose members are interchangeable. A food standards regulation is addressed
to an indefinite number of food producers, however small though their number
may actually be; and it is addressed to members of the group who were not in
119. KIELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 123-46 (1946); Note, 56 YALE
L. J. 670, 678-9 (1947).
120. See Lord Coke's often-quoted reasoning in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b,
76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
121. Fuchs, Procedure it Adinistrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 263-5
(1938); KmsEN, op. cit. supra note 119; Ginnane, supra note 118. And see Philadelphia
Co. v. SEC, 175 F. 2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), noted in 34 MINN. L. Rrv. 464 (1950),
vacated on motion of both parties, 337 U.S. 901 (1949).
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it when the regulation was made. An order, on the other hand, is addressed
to and directs named individuals to do something, though their number may be
great and they may receive notice by publication rather than through the mails.
Orders, moreover, are usually arrived at upon motion of a party,122 whereas
regulations are often promulgated ex motu proprio of the agency.
(2) The makers of the APA, far from improving upon these tentative cri-
teria, have rather destroyed them. The trouble with the mutually exclusive
definitions of Sections 2 (c) and (d) is that now "any action fits both defini-
tions."'1 23 Thus a NLRB cease and desist order is injunctive and final, 124 but
at the same time it interprets law and is of particular applicability and future
effect.125 A food standards regulation is unquestionably the final disposition,
declaratory in form, of an agency,1 26 while it is at the same time a "statement"
of general applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret and
prescribe law.'2 In other words, the two definitions are worthless as far as the
attempt of delineating regulations from orders goes. By defining rules as being
of either general or particular applicability the lawmaker has included in what
could be a workable description of regulations precisely the element that gen-
erally makes a norm a non-regulation, namely, an individual decision or
order. 28 The courts, so far, seem to have either ignored the definitions of (c)
and (d) 1 20 or politely mentioned them without using them.130
Furthermore, we note that the definition of subsection (c) includes in the
term "rule" something not commonly conceived as law, viz., policy statements.
122. There are exceptions even in judicial law, such as disbarment proceedings, and
administrative decisions are not infrequently arrived at in an inquisitory manner.
123. Note, 56 YAIra L. J. 670, 680 (1947). The manner in which APA § 2 (c) and
(d) attempt to distinguish between regulations and orders can be traced to Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1910). For the case then at bar the reasoning
was tenable, but in subsequent opinions the Court has not succeeded in consistently apply-
ing the criteria. Compare Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583 (1927) with Terminal
R. R. Assn. v. United States, 226 U.S. 17, 30 (1924), and Morgan v. United States.
298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936) with Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S.
287, 289 (1920). And see Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 692-4 (9th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Philadelphia Co., supra note 121.
124. APA §2 (d).
125. §2 (c).
126. §2 (d).
127. § 2 (c). And see Willapoint Oysters, supra note 123.
128. The inclusion of "rules of 'particular' applicability" was done by the House Judi-
ciary Committee "in order to avoid controversy (1) and assure coverage of rule making
to named persons." SEN. Doc. No. 248, at 283. In other words, to make sure that the
term covers everything else besides rules! Cf. the discussion in Reich, supra note 118,
at 510-14.
129. E.g., the Philalelphia Co. case, supra note 121; Halstead v. SEC., 182 F. 2d 660
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
130. See, e.g., Arrow Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 182 F. 2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC. 181 F. 2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Willapoint Oysters, supra note
123.
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The somewhat revolutionary character of this inclusion is diminished by the
fact that the Act's rule making procedure does not apply to interpretative rules
and general statements of policy.' 3' The public information provisions of Sec-
tion 3, however, do expressly apply to "statements of general policy or interpre-
tations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public."
In other words, an agency need not follow any particular procedure in arriving
at and formulating a policy; but the policy, or rather its formulation, must be
published in the Federal Register. This means that the Register must carry
items that, while falling in the category of "rules" as set forth in Section 2 (c),
are nevertheless not law in the sense of a binding norm. A regulation in the
customary sense is binding because its promulgation is authorized in the ena-
bling statute. It is, so to speak, a part of the statute. A mere policy statement,
on the other hand, is as such not binding and consequently needs no authoriza-
tion from a norm of a higher legal hierarchy. 132 It merely announces how the
agency intends to interpret the law. Such an announcement may be express
or implied; it may follow from the agency's conduct or it may be deduced from
press releases or newspaper interviews. Thus the NLRB last year announced
the policy, which it has since followed, of declining to take jurisdiction in cases
involving enterprises of mere local importance.3 3 According to the language
of Sections 2 (c) and 3 (a), this policy announcement, or any policy formula-
tion that amounts to a "statement," should be published in the Register despite
the fact that the NLRB is not a rule making agency. But as there is nothing
to prevent an agency from following a policy though unpublished, the law is not
enforceable. Only rule making agencies have followed it, and those only to a
limited extent.
3 4
Subsections (e) through (g). Subsections (e) and (f), defining "license,"
"licensing," "sanction," and "relief," may be passed over quickly. It remains to
be seen whether a terminology that makes "license" a synonym of any permis-
sion is workable.135 The principal error is one of omission. The Act has not
attempted to streamline the involved and altogether neglected legal machinery
by which administrative decisions are "enforced,"-that is, not merely sanc-
131. APA §4 (a).
132. Even as a statute derives its force or, which is the same, validity, from the Con-
stitution. On the hierarchy of norms see K.LSEN, GENERAL THEORY oF LAW AND STATE
123-61 (1945).
133. NLRB Press Release (R-303) of April 6, 1950. The main aspect of the release
is a discussion of the Board's conflicts with its General Counsel.
134. See Reich, supra note 118, at 519-21; Dwan, The Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in THE FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE PRO-
cEDUPR Acr AND THE ADMINIsTRATrVE AGENCIES 144-56, 164-8 (Warren ed. 1947).
135. For a discussion of some of the problems see Foster, Application of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act to the Statutes Administered by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in id. at 213, 225-37, 251-2.
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tioned by a review court but translated into actual fact, such as though con-
tempt procedure.
136
Subsection (g), finally, defines both "agency action" and "agency proceed-
ing." The former term is used only in Section 10, pertaining to judicial review,
and should properly have been defined there. The definition is not very useful
in that it fails, again, to make clear the one important thing that ought to have
been answered: against what acts does judicial review lie.
The other term ("agency proceeding") defined in subsection (g) does occur,
but in Section 6(a), where its meaning is clear beyond doubt. This definition
is therefore a useless superfluity.
136. The necessity of enforcing orders through contempt procedure has delayed final
enforcement of some cases by several years. Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforce-
ment of Administrative Orders, 40 ILL. L. Ryv. 344 (1946).
